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Article 10

THE CRISIS OF
AESTHETICISM
Karen Weisman
Art’s Undoing: In the Wake of a
Radical Aestheticism by Forest
Pyle. New York: Fordham
University Press, 2014. Pp. 322,
11 ills.

This is a passionate book about a
passionate subject; in fact, the experience of reading this text comes
close to replicating one aspect of
the central dynamic it describes:
“how the literary representations
of aestheticization can in certain
circumstances result in an aestheticism powerful and extreme enough
to deliver us to the roots of the aesthetic” (xi–xii). Forest Pyle reads
Romantic and post-Romantic texts
in a white heat of critical engagement, an appropriate stance for a
critic who sets himself the task of
staring into the heart of a radical
aestheticism, one that he defines
as art reaching its own fever pitch,
by which the putative claims of the
aesthetic are undone: “At certain
moments in certain texts by each of
these writers we encounter a radical aestheticism, one that undoes
the claims made in the name of the
aesthetic—as redemptive, restorative, liberating, compensatory,
humanizing, healing—claims that
are not only an irreducible aspect
of the legacy of Romanticism, but
are often spelled out in their most
compelling forms by the writers
themselves” (5). The radical of the
aesthetic in Pyle’s hands becomes
a vacant luminosity, one that we
occupy with a silent, wild surmise.
Pyle’s Romanticism, then, is
highly self-reflexive and postdeconstructionist, with some cultural materialism serving as warm
side notes. Radical aestheticism is
an experience of an interference
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that negates, or rather undoes,
the claims of knowledge that are
putatively related to art. At the
same time, the experience of such
radicalization is emphatically not
a tacit claim for art’s autonomy.
This is no valorization of art for
art’s sake. Precisely because what
Pyle terms radical aestheticism
offers no redemptive claims for art
in the arena of ethics, politics, or
aesthetics, the encounter with it is
often registered as an unmaking
or as combustion or as flaring. Pyle
observes several criteria to meet the
designation of radical aestheticism.
The first will be most familiar to
students of close reading: the text
“must reflect on art and its effects”
(3). The text must “pose or present
questions about art’s relationship
to history or to knowledge, and
on the relationship between art’s
sensuous aspects and its ethical,
political, or theological responsibilities” (3); “and finally, a text can
be understood as succumbing to a
radical aestheticism the moment it
finds itself and its representations
of the aesthetic at its vacating radical” (4, emphasis in the original).
What we have, then, is a view of
a highly self-reflexive literature
that owes a great deal to Walter
Benjamin’s theory of the “aura” but
also to Paul de Man’s textual disarticulations. Pyle indeed cites several
canonical twentieth- and twentyfirst-century theorists throughout
his chapters, and he reads them
as a sort of parallel text to the
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Romantics. Read alongside Shelley,
Keats, Dickinson, Hopkins, and
Wilde are Benjamin, de Man,
Barthes, Derrida, Agamben,
Lacan, Bataille, and others. Pyle
is not claiming that we need one
to understand the other, and he is
certainly not reducing such parallel reading to the domain of
“influence”; rather, he seems to be
modeling different approaches to
critical distance even as he draws
ever nearer to the heart of the texts’
catastrophes. In this, he is trying to
clarify a dynamic of reading and
of writing that calls out for rigorous conceptualizing. There must
be several access points into this
complicated and complicating process of understanding a text’s negation of its own project. One of the
delights of this text is the scrutiny
of authors’ manipulations of their
formalist and generic inheritance.
Pyle performs close readings of his
authors’ formalist power, readings
that are themselves theorized.
Pyle is insistent that he is not
positing a totalizing theory of
Romanticism. He repeats over
and over again that the dynamic
he studies is something that occurs
only “at certain moments in certain
texts.” This is a phrase very selfconsciously reiterated throughout
all of the chapters, not as a textual
tic but as a textual cue to the very
self-conscious care taken by the
author of this critical text. Pyle
describes the reader’s reflexive need
to “turn away” from the consuming
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ON ART’S UNDOING
effects of radical aestheticism; it is,
as he describes it, a crisis, one from
which Anglo-American criticism
has conventionally turned. In this,
the work of the critic is perilous. If
we may get “too close to the text . . .
and stuck in a kind of auratic fascination” (21), then Pyle is taking,
on our behalf, what he describes
as “the risk of proximity” to these
radicalizations, “to understand
who or what might ‘perish’ in the
process” (26). This is a tall order;
or at least, it is announced as if it
were a tall order. And Pyle’s reading often calls attention to its own
emotional and ethical investments.
I take this critical self-reflexivity to
be consonant with the book’s project, which is after all to study the
effects of coming into possession of
the intensity of a work of art that is
all but entirely consuming. It is to
encounter, as he reads it in Shelley’s
“The Triumph of Life,” the poet’s
“light’s severe excess,” which for
Pyle is the “aestheticism that burns
a hole in the heart of this poem”
(63). There may be, at times, a little
bit too much preciousness in such a
tone; all the same, what is at stake
for the literature under discussion is its own self-understanding.
Perhaps we ought to feel it on the
pulses, our own and the critic’s who
delivers it to us.
Reading Shelley, Pyle reads
several lyrics with a view to understanding Shelley’s twinned commitments to aesthetics and politics.
His strongest readings are of “On
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the Medusa of Leonardo” and
“The Triumph of Life,” which he
pinpoints as poems that especially
undo the compensations of the aesthetic. Reading Keats’s The Fall of
Hyperion, Pyle identifies a “glorious burn-out” (101) that affects our
understanding of the relationship
of ethics and aesthetics in Keats’s
poetry. Dickinson is studied as a
poet whose “poems themselves
often produce this eradication of
context, scene, or setting” (108).
We would not naturally expect to
find Gerard Manley Hopkins in a
book featuring such a definition of
aestheticism, but Pyle argues that
whatever Hopkins’s resistance to
mere aestheticism, its radical is to
be found in the poet’s presentation
of “the breath, the aspiration, the
sigh” (149), in which Pyle sees evidence “of a poetics, already radicalized, that exerts such a pressure on
his theological aesthetics that we
encounter something that risks, in
Hopkins’s words, a ‘flame out’ to
the everything and the nothing of
a breath” (149). The pre-Raphaelite Dante Gabriel Rossetti presents
a critical challenge in this overarching thesis because he is already
viewed as the poet-painter of the
superficial. Despite the obviousness of this aestheticism, it is the
very insistence of Rossetti’s superficiality that prepares the ground
for radical aestheticism: “Thus a
radical aestheticism in Rossetti is
not so much an event, a singular
and crisis-ridden occurrence, as
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it is the manifest pressure of the
surface . . . upon everything that
is painted or written” (202). And
finally we have Oscar Wilde, who
is already explicitly dedicated to
aestheticism as his project, who
boldly announces, “Love art and
all the things will be given to you”
(210). The climax of Pyle’s reading
of Wilde is in his examination of
Salomé, in which he observes in
the titular character’s monstrosity—the violence, the kissing of
Jokanaan’s decapitated head in the
moonlight—“a love carried out
in the vertiginous language of an
aestheticism that has exceeded the
claims of beauty and pleasure with
which it is most identified and
tasted its radical” (240).
Pyle resists the temptation to
turn away from such radicalization. His criticism is an impassioned engagement with the ethics
of reading no less than it is a celebration of its very perils. If we
can virtually hear him taking deep
breaths to sustain his reading, that
is because he lovingly recognizes
the demands of the literature he
unveils.
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